

# ***Headquarters U.S. Air Force***

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*Make Energy A Consideration in All We Do™*

## **Towards an Independent Power Production Capability....**



**Responding the Defense Science Board  
Report on Energy Security**

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# ***The Defense Science Board Report***

## ***Task Force on DoD Energy Strategy***

### ***“More Fight – Less Fuel” (Feb 08)***

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- The recommendations from the 2001 DSB Report “More Capable Warfighting Through Reduced Fuel Burden” not implemented
  - **Critical national security and Homeland Defense missions are at risk of extended outage from failure of the grid**
  - DoD lacks the strategy, policies, metrics, information, and governance structure to manage its energy risks
  - Technologies available now to make DoD weapon systems more energy efficient, but they are undervalued, slowing their implementation
  - There are many opportunities to reduce energy demand by changing wasteful operational practices and procedures
  - Operational risks from fuel disruption require demand-side remedies; mission risks from electricity disruption to installations require both demand- and supply-side remedies
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# ***Recommendations of the DSB TF on Energy Security Classified Annex (Jul 08)***


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- **(U) Establish a DOD Senior Energy Official**
- **(U) Establish a Cross-Functional Installation Risk Management Team**
- **(U) Conduct Installation Risk Management Studies at Specific Locations to Establish Procedures, and Develop Risk Assessment and Mitigation Team Skills**
- **(U) Partner with FERC and the State Public Service Commissions**
- **(U) Publish security estimates of the threat**
- **(U) Address Pandora/Aurora Threat**
- **(U) Address (other) Threats & Vulnerabilities to Critical Energy Infrastructure**



## Power Systems are Vulnerable

- Physical attacks to the grid is a long-known issue
  - Lovins' "Brittle Power" in early '80s
- Open sources report that CIA discloses to public they have information of Cyber attacks against Power system controls outside the US.
  - Has resulted in multi-city outage
  - Extortion is a motivation
- US Power systems have been probed
- Connectivity to substations & digital hardware exist
  - NERC Survey (modems, SCADA, Internet, etc...)
  - Restoration time is critical, availability is priority
- Parallels exist to EMP threat; mitigation strategies
- Short Term Outages well understood/contingency ops executed regularly for Wx, system failures




**Extended Grid Outages an Unknown Experience in the US**




# FY07 Air Force Facility Energy Use

### USAF FY07 Facility Energy Use in MBTUs



**71,161,000  
million BTU**

### USAF FY07 Facility Energy Costs (\$000)



**\$1.06 billion**

SOURCE: FY07 ANNUAL ENERGY MANAGEMENT REPORT TO CONGRESS



## *Policy Framework*

- **DoDI 3020.45, Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP) Management, 21 Apr 08**
  - **MilDeps must identify, prioritize, and assess critical assets and infrastructure dependencies vital to execution of required Combatant Command and Service capabilities**
  - **MilDeps must fund and resource a CIP program and develop and implement remediation plans**
- **DODI 4170.11, Installation Energy Management, 22 Nov 05, para 5.2.3**
  - **Directs Military Departments to take necessary steps to ensure the security of energy and water resources**
  - **Conduct Vulnerability Assessments, mitigate risks, and investigate off-base utility systems**
  - **Incorporate identified vulnerabilities into established Critical Asset Assurance Programs**
  - **Invest in Renewable energy sources and distributed energy systems, including off-base systems, if economical**
  - **Procurement Strategy: encourage partnerships with Defense Energy Supply Center for regional solutions**



## ***DOD Response of the DSB TF on Energy Security***

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- **Define an active role for DOD in the Energy CIP's Government Coordinating Council**
- **Respond to the specific AURORA threat vector**
- **Quantify the other vulnerabilities/threats/risks to military installations**
- **Prioritize and implement mitigation strategies, to include:**
  - **Demand Reduction**
  - **Supply-side Assurance**
  - **Culture Change**



## ***Towards an Independent Power Production Capability....***

- **Renewables mandated – 13% by 2013 directed by law/EO, growing to 25% by 2025 by DOD policy**
  - .... but is storage technologies lagging?
- **Unconventional Fuels (H<sub>2</sub>, CTL, Oil Shale, Bio-fuels) evolving**
  - .... but shouldn't it be used for transportation sector (including aviation)?
- **Small, packaged, intrinsically safe and secure nuclear power for installations**
  - ..... Working with DOE, can the Military as a first adopter?
  - ..... How to solve the NIMBY issue?
  - ..... Can it be cost effective?
  - ..... Could it set up an opportunity for a “national security grid” in/around the military installation?



## *Way Ahead*

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- **DOD work with DOE (and the industry) to define the possible role Nuclear Power might play on military installations**
    - **Build from the experiences of the 1950/60s**
    - **Define the pros/cons**
    - **Assess community support**
    - **Examine the economics**